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Contextual Variability in Personality
From Significant–Other Knowledge
and Relational Selves
Susan M. Andersen*, Rugile Tuskeviciute, Elizabeth Przybylinski, Janet N. Ahn† and
Joy H. Xu†
Department of Psychology, New York University, New York, NY, USA
We argue that the self is intrinsically embedded in an interpersonal context such
that it varies in IF–THEN terms, as the relational self. We have demonstrated
that representations of the significant other and the relationship with that other
are automatically activated by situational cues and that this activation affects both
experienced and expressed aspects of the self and personality. Here, we expand
on developments of the IF–THEN cognitive-affective framework of personality system
(Mischel and Shoda, 1995), by extending it to the domain of interpersonal relationships
at the dyadic level (Andersen and Chen, 2002). Going beyond Mischel’s early research
(Mischel, 1968), our framework combines social cognition and learning theory with
a learning-based psychodynamic approach, which provides the basis for extensive
research on the social-cognitive process of transference and the relational self as it
arises in everyday social interactions (Andersen and Cole, 1990), evidence from which
contributes to a modern conceptualization of personality that emphasizes the centrality
of the situation.
Keywords: significant others, relational self, close relationships, transference, cross-situational inconsistency
INTRODUCTION
The notion that people’s responses and behavior will tend to vary by the situation they are in, as a
function of internal states, mental representations, and interpretations that are brought to the fore
by cues in the situation (Mischel, 1968, 1973, 1977; Wright and Mischel, 1987; Shoda et al., 1994),
was iconoclastic when proposed, but is now supported by considerable evidence.While it may seem
that people tend to possess global traits that do not vary appreciably by situation, this concept does
not do justice to the complex nature of personality. In situ research has demonstrated substantial
variability inbehavior across situations (Mischel, 1968),while stability canbeobserved in thepattern
of behavior individuals engage in across diﬀerent situations over time (Mischel and Peake, 1982;
Mischel and Shoda, 1995). What arises is a kind of personality signature or behavior proﬁle across
situations. Indeed, variability across situations that is stable over time is now rather widely accepted
(e.g., Kenrick and Funder, 1988; Fleeson, 2001; Funder, 2008; Fleeson and Noftle, 2009).
In this article, we present a conceptual framework and a line of research in the interpersonal
domain that characterizes individual behavior as the result of context-speciﬁc cues and makes use
of long-term memory storage in a dynamic way—that is, emphasizing both what the individual
brings to the table from personal experience and the situational cues that trigger such experience.
We present the social-cognitive model of transference and the relational self, and the research
that supports it (e.g., Chen and Andersen, 1999; Andersen and Chen, 2002), as an IF–THEN
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person-situation interaction model and an interpersonal version
of what is known as the cognitive-aﬀective personality system or
cognitive-aﬀective processing system (CAPS) approach. Beyond
this, we go further here than elsewhere in specifying the
relation of our framework to the CAPS model, and further,
address explicitly the voluminous literature on trait dispositions
(particularly interpersonal traits) and their potential interface
with this framework.
The CAPS framework relies on cognitive-aﬀective units
(CAUs), which represent individual experience and contribute to
an individual’s interpretations and behavior in particular contexts
(Mischel and Shoda, 1995; see also Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999).
Past experience alters the meaning and signiﬁcance accorded to
present situations, and importantly, the strength and likelihood
of relevant behaviors being enacted in those situations. Of central
importance in predicting human behavior, and if desired, in
changing it, is accounting for the stimuli in situations that
prompt particular behavioral patterns (Metcalfe and Mischel,
1999). The cognitive-aﬀective systems model of personality is
thus an IF–THEN theory in which the situation—or set of
triggering cues—interacts with whatever disposition or set of
associations the individual has with these cues, which in turn,
places the individual in a distinct psychological situation. Indeed,
the situational IF cue(s) evokes a contextual THEN, or the
relevant experience and behavior.
In our research, we have examined howmental representations
of signiﬁcant others—that is, any important person, such as a
close friend, current or past romantic partner, sibling, or parent
whom the individual knows well and has had a considerable
impact on the individual—arise as a function of contextual cues,
and inﬂuence moment-to-moment interpersonal responses on
the basis of their implicit activation. Because signiﬁcant-other
representations are often evoked and used, they tend to be
chronically accessible (Andersen et al., 1995) and are even more
likely to be evoked if triggering cues are present in the situation
(Andersen et al., 1995; Chen et al., 1999; see Higgins, 1989, 1990).
Hence, in the process known as transference, certain cues in a new
person, such as his or her behavior or conveyed beliefs, attributes,
or even facial features, can activate a relevant signiﬁcant-
other representation. The representation is then applied to
understanding the new person. Of course, signiﬁcant others
are, by deﬁnition, people in whom the individual is invested
emotionally and motivationally (Higgins, 1987, 1997; Hinkley
and Andersen, 1996; Andersen et al., 1998). Hence, they allow for
special relevance to be accorded to a new person, when triggered
in transference, leading the new person to be seen, interpreted,
and remembered in terms of signiﬁcant-other knowledge, while
also evoking a variety of relationship-speciﬁc and self-with-other
experiences that are emotional and motivational in nature.
Accordingly, cues of any subtle resemblance to a signiﬁcant
other in a new person will evoke the signiﬁcant-other
representation, the relational self, and the transference process
in IF–THEN terms. In many instances, this process can be
interpersonally useful, easing social interactions, and prompting
the individual to give new persons the beneﬁt of the doubt, as
positive feelings toward the signiﬁcant other are felt anew toward
(“transferred” to) these new persons (e.g., Andersen and Chen,
2002). In fact, under some circumstances, it can even diminish
intergroup bias (Saribay and Andersen, 2007) and promote a
sense of shared reality (Przybylinski and Andersen, 2012, 2015).
However, it can have detrimental consequences as well (e.g.,
Berenson and Andersen, 2006; Reznik and Andersen, 2007; Berk
and Andersen, 2008; Miranda et al., 2013) if the relationship with
the activated signiﬁcant other happens to be troubled in some
way, even if this person is otherwise loved.
Given that the concept of transference derives from
psychoanalytic thought (Freud, 1958, 1963) as modernized
in neo-Freudian and interpersonal terms (Sullivan, 1953), it is
perhaps less surprising that we conceptualize and examine it
in social-cognitive terms (Andersen and Glassman, 1996; Chen
and Andersen, 1999; Andersen and Chen, 2002). Drawing on a
set of century-old assumptions about personality, psychological
disturbance, and treatment, this work is clearly relevant to
bridging the gap between contemporary social cognition,
interpersonal approaches to the self, and psychodynamics.
Moreover, it construes person-situation interactions as an
interpersonal version of a cognitive-aﬀective system approach.
A central contribution of this research is that it begins to
populate the CAPS model with needed content and content
speciﬁcity. Indeed, the CAPS model focuses primarily on process
and to a degree, structure, while providing relatively little
guidance as to the content of CAUs within the model. The
current framework and research does this with a focus on the
interpersonal domain, and outlines situations and processesmore
speciﬁcally. In particular, we emphasize how individual behavior
varies across interpersonal situations, in a manner determined
partly by the process of transference. In the process, elements of
the interpersonal situation (i.e., of the person one is interacting
with) resemble and, in turn, implicitly and automatically bring to
mind a prior signiﬁcant other, which inﬂuences the individual’s
inferences about and evaluation of the new person. Indirectly,
this activation also brings to mind the relationship with this
signiﬁcant other, as well as the individual’s view of the self
in this relationship at the moment, his or her motivation,
goals, and regulatory strategies, not to mention emotions and
behaviors. Accordingly, in the CAPS model, the CAUs, such
as expectancies, goals, aﬀect, and self-regulatory plans, form a
“system” of units that interact with each other in mediating
behavior. In our approach, these units consist of the various
aspects of an individual’s signiﬁcant-other relationships, and
such units are organized in terms of individual representations
of speciﬁc signiﬁcant others and one’s relationship with each,
which are all stored in memory. Each one can be triggered from
memory when the signiﬁcant other is implicitly activated by
subtly relevant cues in the environment (a person, a situation),
leading to shifts in observed responses.
Further, our approach treats “dispositions” as reﬂected and
embodied by the content of the longstanding signiﬁcant-
other representations and relationships in memory, which
enable both stability in the individual’s responses and the
variability that arises in them across relevant interpersonal
situations. Research on trait approaches to individual diﬀerences
deﬁnes personality in terms of global dispositions that are
shared and nomothetic (people diﬀer in the degree to which
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they hold a trait, rather than in its qualitative deﬁnition),
and some trait dispositions are explicitly interpersonal (e.g.,
need for aﬃliation, extraversion, agreeableness, dominance).
Our approach, by contrast, deﬁnes personality and individual
diﬀerences particularly ideographically, based on prior learning
and prior relationship experience. Although we do not argue
that all variability across situations in individual responding (or
stability over time) is reducible to interpersonal experience alone,
nor that signiﬁcant-other representations and relationships are
the sole basis for the content of self and personality, we do simply
argue that such knowledge in memory captures meaningful,
longstanding, personally relevant knowledge, that anchors the
individual in his or her own prior learning and experience, while
still enabling variability in individual behavior to emerge as a
function of variability in interpersonal contexts.
THE RELATIONAL SELF
Imagine that a new employee is hired at your workplace. He loves
reading mystery novels, much as your adored older brother does,
has a similar liking for Italian food, and even similar quirks (e.g.,
the same bombastic laugh). You immediately like him without
knowing why and ﬁnd yourself holding his opinion in especially
high esteem. You even doubt yourself when you disagree with
him, which you do not do with other coworkers. In this case, your
self-doubt cannot be explained solely by a general personality
trait (e.g., insecurity), or by the situation itself (being at work).
Our model of transference, however, provides a framework for
understanding why, when, and how this speciﬁc kind of response
happens.
In transference, the representation of a signiﬁcant other
(e.g., one’s brother) will be activated when a new person (e.g.,
the coworker) resembles that signiﬁcant other in some subtle
way (e.g., has a similar laugh). This resemblance can come
in the form of the new person’s personal characteristics, such
as interests, behavioral tendencies, values, interpersonal style,
speciﬁc expressions, or physical appearance. Once the signiﬁcant-
other representation is activated, it tends to be applied to the new
person, inﬂuencing one’s perception of the new person and one’s
responses to him or her (Andersen and Cole, 1990; Andersen
and Baum, 1994). Thus, signiﬁcant-other cues encountered in a
situation combined with knowledge stored in memory (which
is chronically accessible) about the signiﬁcant other, aﬀect both
interpretations of the new person as well as one’s responses to
him or her. For instance, knowledge one has of the signiﬁcant
other is then assumed to be true of the new person who resembles
this signiﬁcant other, in addition to what one actually sees and
learns about the new person. The individual then thinks that he or
she “learned” this transferred information about the new person,
when, in fact, the individual did not.
This eﬀect on memory can be evoked based not only on cues
to a new person’s characteristics, but, as implied, also on his or
her facial resemblance to a signiﬁcant other (Kraus and Chen,
2010), and has been shown to persist for weeks (Glassman and
Andersen, 1999b). Moreover, cues of either sort can provoke a
relatively automatic positive evaluation of a new person when
he or she implicitly resembles a signiﬁcant other who is also
regarded positively—that is, liked or loved (e.g., Andersen and
Cole, 1990; Andersen and Baum, 1994; Andersen et al., 1995;
Chen et al., 1999; Günaydin et al., 2012). Finally, this transference
process not only occurs implicitly (Andersen et al., 2005), but can
also be triggered by cues presented entirely outside of awareness
(Glassman and Andersen, 1999a). The latter is of importance
both because the notion of the unconscious is so predominant
in psychodynamic theory and in the transference concept, and
because it suggests that the process of transference may not be
readily detected or intentionally controlled.
Signiﬁcant-other representations are linked in memory to
representations of the self by the relationship with each
signiﬁcant other (Andersen and Chen, 2002). Thus, individuals
have a speciﬁc relational self associated with each signiﬁcant
other represented in memory (Andersen et al., 1997; Chen and
Andersen, 1999; Andersen and Chen, 2002: see also Baldwin,
1992; Chen et al., 2006), reﬂecting the version of the self
generally experienced in that relationship. Accordingly, these
versions of the self are also indirectly activated when a signiﬁcant-
other representation is activated as a function of situational
triggering cues. Because any signiﬁcant-other cue can activate
the signiﬁcant-other representation, these cues will also indirectly
activate the self-with-signiﬁcant-other representation and the
signiﬁcant-other relationship. Once these representations are
activated, one “becomes” who one typically is with that signiﬁcant
other. Furthermore, motivations and goals relevant to the
signiﬁcant-other relationship are also activated in response to the
new person—for instance, one might be particularly motivated
to not be candid with him or her. In transference, information
about the signiﬁcant other’s past acceptance or rejection stored
in memory should also be activated when the signiﬁcant-other
representation is activated and thus should also be anticipated
from the new person. In this way, the signiﬁcant other need not be
physically present to greatly inﬂuence the self and interpersonal
interactions.
Said diﬀerently, signiﬁcant others have been shown to be
represented in memory in a manner that is rich in features
and highly distinctive (Andersen and Cole, 1990; Andersen
et al., 1998), both in terms of personality characteristics and
physical features, as well as in interpersonal styles, habits, and
interpersonal tendencies. Moreover, included in such signiﬁcant-
other knowledge are complex IF–THEN units that reﬂect the
particular psychological (internal) states these others experience
and how they behave based on them (as situational contexts,
Idson and Mischel, 2001; Chen, 2003). Hence, such knowledge
structures are complex.
RELEVANT CONCEPTIONS
OF PERSONALITY
Traits as Dispositions
Although most trait theorists, historically, have acknowledged
the relevance of situations to trait expression (e.g., Allport, 1937;
Murray, 1938; Cattell, 1965), and the interaction between the
person and the situation, this has not tended to be emphasized or
commonly examined in empirical research. That is, the consensus
was (and largely is) that trait dispositions are stable over time, as
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are their correlates, and as such, are worthy of study in their own
right, independent of context. This makes sense, and of course,
Mischel’s early work also prompted systematic research pitting
the person against the situation (and vice versa) in numerous
trait-situation studies at the debate’s inception (e.g., Endler, 1975;
Sarason et al., 1975; Endler and Magnusson, 1976; Magnusson
and Endler, 1977), and onward, with results sometimes favoring
the person and sometimes the situation, depending on the design
of the research (Bem, 1972; see also Wachtel, 1973). Since then,
the inclusion of potentiating environmental factors, whether life
events like stressors or encounters with relevant situations, or
experimental manipulations, for example, contextual “primes”
that bring to mind trait-relevant content (e.g., Moskowitz, 1988;
Schmit et al., 1995) has become less atypical, as researchers have
examined both transient and more stable factors in observed
personality responding (e.g., Chaplin et al., 1988; Murtha et al.,
1996; Pervin, 2000). The stability of traits over time is of course
well-argued and demonstrated (e.g., Block, 1971; Costa and
McCrae, 1988; McCrae and Costa, 1990; Roberts and DelVecchio,
2000), and in conjunction with the person by situation debate,
which addresses variability by context (even if just referring to
contextual “primes”), the research on cross-situational variability
is important and revealing about personality processes and
content.
Considered diﬀerently, a question that arises is: What
constitutes personality (and individual diﬀerences in personality)
in the ﬁrst place? It is presumably not restricted to trait
dispositions. For example, more speciﬁc dispositional tendencies
are presumably pertinent as well, such as the chronic individual
diﬀerence of believing one is falling short of the ideal standards
that a signiﬁcant other holds for one, in longstanding goals with
a signiﬁcant other (e.g., for aﬀection) that may have chronically
gone unsatisﬁed, and more broadly, individual diﬀerences in
chronic depression, or rejection sensitivity, or attachment style.
We see these as deeply relevant to an interpersonal view of
personality although such individual diﬀerences are not as broad
as global trait dispositions per se, and the former have been
examined in research on the relational self and transference
(noted below). Trait dispositions, on the other hand, have not.
Beyond simply examining individual diﬀerences inpersonality,
a central focus in conceptualizing personality as involving the
relational self and stored knowledge about signiﬁcant others is on
illuminating what makes a person unique (Allport, 1937; Kelly,
1955; see also Higgins, 1990). Certainly, this is the thrust of
George Kelly’s approach to personality. We also aim to examine,
not so much what is general and global in dispositions, but
rather, what is idiographic about the individual in the domain of
relationships. Indeed, the content of signiﬁcant-other knowledge
is idiographic—that is, the features that deﬁne signiﬁcant-other
knowledge are varied, including assumed qualities, habits, and
the like, and these features are speciﬁc to each individual and to
the particular relationship—and also, by deﬁnition, stable over
time. The relationship with the signiﬁcant other is also unique
to the person and is comprised of content that is speciﬁc to
the way the individual interacts with that other, which is in
turn indirectly evoked with new persons when the signiﬁcant-
other representation is implicitly cued. On the other hand, the
process itself that is triggered when contextual cues activate such
prior knowledge—the overall process by which signiﬁcant-other
representations are activated and used with a new person—is
common and nomothetic across people (Andersen and Chen,
2002). Our approach to the relational self (and transference),
which is an idiographic-nomothetic approach that captures the
unique in stored knowledge and the general in process, ultimately
integrates both what is stable in the self and personality, and what
is variable across triggering cues, providing a more nuanced and
complete view.
Still, global traits and dispositions could, indeed, be readily
examined in relation to this process. Based on existing research,
we assume that the process of transference is likely to be triggered
and to transpire quite readily regardless of individual diﬀerences
in trait dispositions. However, the content of any individual’s
relational responses (those that depend on the relationship and
the self in the relationship) may well vary considerably from
another individual’s, based on such dispositional diﬀerences,
potentially predicting diﬀerentiated aﬀective, and motivational
responses. These are empirical questions that remain open.
On this note, one might ask the question of how this
relational self (and transference) research links or speciﬁcally
interacts with existing structural models of personality
emphasizing interpersonal traits, such as aﬃliation, extraversion,
agreeableness, or dominance. While the current research does
not speak to the exact ways in which such dispositions may
emerge in transference and the relational self, such interpersonal
traits have been found to be of importance in interpersonal
situations (see McClelland, 1985). For instance, the need for
aﬃliation as well as for intimacy has been shown to underlie
behavioral variability in interpersonal contexts (McAdams and
Constantian, 1983; McAdams, 1999), for both men and women,
and is assessed mostly using the thematic apperception test
(TAT). As such, correlational work shows that those high in
need for intimacy are more motivated to connect, share, and
communicate with others, and are inclined to focus more on
communal goals (McAdams and Powers, 1981; McAdams and
Constantian, 1983), in addition to making more eye contact, and
smiling and laughing more (McAdams et al., 1984). Likewise,
extraversion, which is part of the Big Five (and also assessed
by self-report), has been associated with one’s ability to create
positive social environments (Eaton and Funder, 2003). Indeed,
extraverts tend to be more popular (Paunonen, 2003) and tend
to have more satisfying romantic relationships (e.g., Watson
et al., 2000). Relatedly, agreeableness (i.e., another Big Five trait
assessed by self-report) is associated with better interpersonal
adjustment among peers in adolescence (Graziano et al., 1997),
more helping behavior (e.g., Graziano et al., 2007), and likeability
(Nikitin and Freund, 2015). It has been linked as well to
more distress in response to interpersonal conﬂict (Suls et al.,
1998), and to preferences for tactics of de-escalation, such as
negotiation rather than power assertion (Graziano et al., 1996).
By contrast, trait dominance has been associated mainly with
others’ perceptions of the individual as competent (as reported
by fellow group members and outside observers; Anderson and
Kilduﬀ, 2009), and relatedly, dominance-conveying behaviors
(assessed by independent observers) have been shown to be more
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commonly expressed with same-sex friends than with same- or
opposite-sex strangers (Moskowitz, 1988).
With any such global trait disposition, such as these, one might
predict that some of the processes revealed in the research on
transference and the relational self may be more pronounced
among people high in the particular interpersonal trait. Our guess
is that this may not necessarily be the case, and rather, it is
likely that each of these particular traits may further predict the
content of the particular relational self and relationship patterns
that arise, based on signiﬁcant-other activation and use (e.g., in
transference). This question may warrant future examination.
Cognitive Models
One way of thinking about the notion of transference is from the
perspective of George Kelly’s personal construct theory (Kelly,
1955). In this model of personality, people formulate personal
constructs to represent the social environment, especially
other people and themselves, by categorizing them into trait
adjective terms. These personal constructs then guide individual
interpretations, decisions, and actions. According to Kelly,
signiﬁcant others are fundamental to the constructs a person
forms and stores in memory (each labeled by a trait adjective)
because these constructs help the individual understand how
various signiﬁcant others are similar to and diﬀerent from each
other as well as from (and to) the self. These constructs are
idiographic in nature—that is, unique to the individual. Mischel
(1973) argued that such constructs are central to cognition,
and are formed through basic social-learning mechanisms. By
the latter extension, expectancies, learning strategies, and self-
regulation are evoked by stimuli in speciﬁc situations based on
what is stored in memory.
Of course, research on trait dispositions can be (and has been)
conducted in cognitive terms, whether to identify the cognitive
level of speciﬁcity and evaluative components of trait concepts
(John et al., 1991) or to directly examine, for example, trait anxiety
or neuroticism, and processes associated with each, in terms of
how they are contextually cued and with what consequences (e.g.,
Eysenck, 2000), or to examine how trait categories inﬂuence social
perception (e.g., Kenrick and Stringﬁeld, 1980;Woike andBender,
2009; see also Kihlstrom, 2013). Similarly, numerous researchers
in clinical psychology have focused on individual diﬀerences in
clinical syndromes such as phobia or major depression, and as
such, they have long examined cognitive schemas of feared objects
or of the self to illuminate the link between provoking stimulus
cues or interpersonal situations and relevant existing knowledge
(e.g., Hammen et al., 1985; Mathews and MacLeod, 1987). Still,
idiographic measurement in the trait domain has remained rather
atypical (although see, e.g., Lamiell, 1981; McAdams, 1996; and
see also Larson and Csikszentmihalyi, 1983; Fournier et al., 2002;
Conner et al., 2009).
Our model of the relational self and transference (Andersen
and Chen, 2002) draws from both personal construct theory
(Kelly, 1955) and Mischel’s later notion of the cognitive-aﬀective
processing system (CAPS,Mischel and Shoda, 1995), to show that
individuals bearing minimal resemblance to signiﬁcant others
implicitly activate signiﬁcant-other representations and this leads
to various perceptual, aﬀective, and behavioral consequences. In
doing so, this model integrates the perspectives of psychoanalysis,
behaviorism, and cognitive-behavioral approaches (Andersen
and Saribay, 2006). Of course, at its core, it is a cognitive
model, but conceptually it is also inﬂuenced by basic learning
processes (learning theory, behaviorism) and by interpersonal
psychodynamic approaches (Sullivan, 1953) that link the self to
signiﬁcant others and emphasize the central role of motivation
and emotion. It nonetheless remains most compatible with other
cognitive approaches (see, e.g., Kihlstrom, 2013).
Personality Prototypes as Mental
Representations
In contrast to a fully idiographic approach, it is worth noting that
personality prototype models (Cantor and Mischel, 1977, 1979)
are based onknowledge about (conceptualizations of) personality,
stored in memory, and grounded largely in general, nomothetic
knowledge (beliefs) about people, such as trait assumptions or
notions of personality types. Personality prototypes canbe deﬁned
by a trait (i.e., adjective) label, designating a main feature of an
individual’s personality (and its synonyms) or by a noun label (see
alsoHiggins andKing, 1981), the latter of which ismore elaborate,
richer, and more distinctive in features, as in a “caricature” or
stereotype of the whole of an individual’s personality (Andersen
and Klatzky, 1987). As such it is used particularly eﬃciently in
making judgments (Andersen et al., 1990). Our work expands
and moves beyond such notions of personality types, overall, to
what may be the richest and most distinctive of such mental
representations in memory (e.g., Andersen and Cole, 1990,
Studies 1 and 2)—those that designate signiﬁcant others in the
individual’s life (i.e., each of one’s various signiﬁcant others). This
should and does make these representations compelling tools for
encoding. The richer and more distinctive the representations,
the more accessible and likely they are to be used, a notion (about
signiﬁcant-other representations) that is well supported by the
data, as we show (e.g., Andersen and Cole, 1990, Study 3).
Indeed, a further innovation of early work on personality
prototypes was to use cognitive measures (e.g., a recognition
memory paradigm) to measure, experimentally, when and how
personality prototypes are applied to a new person to “go
beyond the information given” about this new person (Bruner,
1957; Cantor and Mischel, 1977). In this research, these traits
were conceptualized as cognitive concepts, held in memory
(see also Kenrick and Stringﬁeld, 1980; Kihlstrom, 2013), that
implicitly inﬂuence the kind of personality assumptions that the
individual tends to make about others. Research on transference
(e.g., Andersen and Cole, 1990) adapted that experimental
paradigm (Cantor and Mischel, 1977) and, in so doing, oﬀered
the ﬁrst evidence that transference occurs as a social-cognitive
process in everyday perception. Further, the transference eﬀect
has been replicated repeatedly, including a variety of control
conditions designed to rule out alternative explanations, and
measuring a variety of consequences beyond the signature
biased inference/memory and evaluation eﬀects, all of which
arise based on a new person’s resemblance to a signiﬁcant
other (and the relationship and relational self evoked). Such
consequences include relevant shifts in the motivation and goals
that are pursued, behaviors that are enacted, and the sense of
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self experienced, along with relevant shifts in emotions (e.g.,
Andersen et al., 1995, 1996; Baum and Andersen, 1999; Glassman
and Andersen, 1999a; Berk and Andersen, 2000, 2008; Berenson
and Andersen, 2006; Reznik and Andersen, 2007; Miranda et al.,
2013; Przybylinski and Andersen, 2015). Of course, a signiﬁcant-
other representation is an n-of-one representation, and hence,
not a personality prototype per se.
PSYCHOANALYTIC
AND PSYCHODYNAMIC
CONCEPT OF TRANSFERENCE
The Psychoanalytic
Historically, the concept of transference has been focal in
psychoanalysis (Freud, 1958), and has referred to the assumption
that patients re-experience unconscious psychosexual impulses
(libidinous drive) and conﬂicts from childhood with their analyst
(Freud, 1958, 1963; see also Andersen and Glassman, 1996).
Libidinous drive fuels structures of mind (id, ego, and superego),
he proposed, and although he did note that “imagoes” may be
formed of one’s parents, these have no causal role in the theory.
Indeed, in the drive-structure model (Greenberg and Mitchell,
1983), the structures of mind and the unconscious psychosexual
drive that fuels it are universal; people vary mainly in intensity
of their libidinal drive. Transference, in his view, is thus fueled
by libidinal impulses and processes. Freud acknowledged too
that transference can transpire outside of the patient-therapist
relationship, but this was far from his emphasis (Freud, 1958; see
Luborsky and Crits-Christoph, 1990). Our emphasis is on social-
cognitive processes in which “transference” occurs in everyday
perception and interpersonal interaction, arising as an ordinary,
non-defensive process, based on signiﬁcant-other knowledge
stored in memory that is triggered situationally by interpersonal
cues. Hence, ours is a distinctively non-Freudian characterization,
although we retain the term and the overall assumption that
something about one’s past experience emerges in the present.
The Psychodynamic
More speciﬁcally, our approach draws directly from that
of the neo-Freudian, Harry Stack Sullivan, an interpersonal
psychodynamic theorist who contradicted most of Freud’s
assumptions (he dropped the entire drive-structure model,
the notion of infantile psychosexual drive, and unconscious
libidinal wish), focusing instead on actual interpersonal learning.
Sullivan proposed the notion of parataxic distortion, a version
of transference in which “personiﬁcations” of signiﬁcant others
and of the self (linked through “dynamisms” or relational
dynamics) both emerge with new people (Sullivan, 1953).
Personiﬁcations and dynamisms are somewhat analogous to
mental representations of signiﬁcant others and the relationship,
respectively, and are developed through actual learning and
interpersonal interactions with signiﬁcant others (rather
than drive). Given that Sullivan rejected assumptions about
psychosexual drive made by Freud, he proposed instead basic
needs for satisfaction and safety (security). Expressing one’s
own perceptions, feelings, and beliefs in words with others,
and also developing one’s own talents and capabilities, in each
case while managing to remain connected (“integrated”) with
signiﬁcant others, together fulﬁll the former need. Security is
compromised if a balance across these components of satisfaction
cannot be reached. As such, the content of personiﬁcations and
dynamisms includes these motivations and how they were (or
were not) met with the signiﬁcant other, and these are reﬂected
in parataxic distortion with others (i.e., transference) as well.
Sullivan’s assumptions about motivation are quite consistent
with ours, although we have proposed other human needs
as well—that is, for connection, autonomy, competency and
control, comprehension/meaning, and security (Andersen
et al., 1997; Andersen and Chen, 2002). Like Freud, Sullivan
emphasized transference in the therapeutic context. On the other
hand, he also discussed its occurrence in everyday life and did so
more than Freud did. We, of course, emphasize signiﬁcant-other
representations and their association in memory with the self, as
well as the processes by which they are brought to mind in new
interpersonal encounters, aﬀecting perception and behavior. Our
approach is thus vastly closer to Sullivan’s than to Freud’s, even
though we adopt Freud’s term–transference–simply because it is
less cumbersome and, generally, more recognizable.
It is also worth noting that aspects of Sullivan’s interpersonal
model are similar to object relations theory, as described
by Melanie Klein and others, with the exception that the
former emphasizes interpersonal learning and behavior as well
as actual interpersonal experiences, while the latter focuses
more on fantasy and libidinal drive (Klein, 1946, 1952;
Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983; Grotstein, 1985). Still, like
Sullivan, object relations theorists assume a notion similar to
mental representations of signiﬁcant others—individuals develop
internalized relations with objects (signiﬁcant persons) in the
environment, and engage in projective identiﬁcation in which
these internalizations can be projected onto others. They also
largely focused on transference in the therapeutic context, while
not rejecting that it may arise in everyday life.
Attachment Theory
Attachment theory is yet another framework inwhich interactions
with signiﬁcant others are thought to contribute to the
development of internal working models of the self and others
that are then used in subsequent relationships, inﬂuencing
beliefs, memories, emotions, expectations, and behaviors about
others as well as the self (Bowlby, 1973). These working models
are developed from early interactions with attachment ﬁgures,
reﬂecting expectations about the availability and responsiveness
of the caregiver in times of stress, and whether or not the
self is competent and worthy of love (Bowlby, 1969). A core
assumption is that these working models serve as the basis
for later relationships. Much research has focused on infant-
caregiver interactions in the Strange Situation paradigm as well as
toddler/child-caregiver interactions (e.g., Thompson, 1998, 1999),
and of course, on adult attachment in romantic relationships that
involve categories of secure or insecure attachment, assessed by
self-report (e.g., Hazan and Shaver, 1987; Bartholomew, 1990;
Griﬃn and Bartholomew, 1994; Pietromonaco and Barrett, 2000;
Mikulincer and Shaver, 2007).While the latter function as a broad
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individual diﬀerences (e.g., avoidant attachment), people alsohave
relationship-speciﬁc working models (e.g., Baldwin et al., 1996;
Overall et al., 2003; Klohnen et al., 2005). Working models in the
attachment framework are similar to mental representations (of
self, other, and the relationship) in that they guide responding in
new situations, when relevant. Hence, although our model does
not originate from attachment theory, or share its precise focus,
it is clearly compatible as a framework.
In Sum
Since its inception, the concept of transference has been examined
largely theoretically, rather than empirically, and thus rarely
subjected to the scrutiny of science (with some exceptions, e.g.,
Horowitz, 1989, 1991; Luborsky and Crits-Christoph, 1990). How
transference has been deﬁned has also diﬀered depending on the
theorists involved (e.g., Greenson, 1965; Ehrenreich, 1989), with
the common components tending to reﬂect “the experiencing
of feelings, drives, attitudes, fantasies, and defenses toward a
person in the present which are inappropriate to the person
and are a repetition, a displacement of reaction originating in
regard to signiﬁcant persons of early childhood” (Greenson, 1965,
p. 156). Although the conception of transference and the data
we have are compatible with this deﬁnition in broad strokes,
our framework and data focus on a wide variety of signiﬁcant
others (not only from early childhood) and highlight the precise
cognitive processes that evidence suggests underlie transference.
Speciﬁcally, our framework and data emphasize what is likely to
trigger transference and how—that is, under what circumstances
and with what consequences—leading to precise predictions that
are subjected to experimental test. Such evidence emphasizes the
speciﬁc nature of each particular signiﬁcant other in one’s life
and the relationship one has with him or her, as well as the self
as experienced with that signiﬁcant other, while also examining
the basic cognitive processes that underlie the transference eﬀect.
We examine the cues in an interpersonal situation that trigger
transference, the speciﬁc processes that prompt it, and its precise
consequences that arise via what knowledge is stored in memory.
EVIDENCE SUPPORTING TRANSFERENCE
AND RELATIONAL SELF
A Word on Methods
Research on transference typically uses a two-session paradigm.
In the ﬁrst session, participants name and describe at least one
signiﬁcant other by listing an equal number of positive and
negative sentences (two to six words each)—about the signiﬁcant
other’s interests, likes, attitudes, beliefs, tendencies, or speciﬁc
behaviors or styles (e.g., likes to think about politics, plays the
ﬂute, is even-tempered)—and then rank-ordering the sentences
based on their descriptiveness of this signiﬁcant other. Weeks
later, participants return for a supposedly unrelated experiment,
and are for example, randomly assigned to a condition in
which they learn about a new person who is described using
some of the features the participant listed in the ﬁrst session
about their signiﬁcant other intermixed with ﬁller items that
are indicated as being irrelevant to the signiﬁcant other, or a
new person who does not resemble a signiﬁcant other at all
(e.g., Andersen and Baum, 1994; Andersen et al., 1996; Berk
and Andersen, 2000; Berenson and Andersen, 2006). Hence, in
one condition the new person bears a subtle resemblance to
the signiﬁcant other. In a yoked control condition, signiﬁcant-
other descriptions are instead drawn from those that another
participant listed about his or her signiﬁcant other. This
one-to-one yoking of a participant in the control condition
with one in the transference condition ensures that those in
the resemblance and control conditions are presented with
exactly the same descriptions. This allows us to control for
content of the features used and thus rule out the possibility
that descriptions of any signiﬁcant other can trigger the
transference process. After being presented with descriptions
about the new person, participants complete various dependent
measures.
It is worth noting as well that we have also made use of
a fully within-subjects design in which the participant learns
about various new persons, one of whom resembles their own
signiﬁcant other, while the other new persons do not, allowing
for the examination of shifts in the same participant’s responses
as a function of triggering cues (e.g., Andersen and Cole, 1990;
Andersen et al., 1995; Glassman and Andersen, 1999b). In
addition, we often cross such within-participant manipulations
with between-subject factors in a mixed model design (e.g., Chen
et al., 1999; Przybylinski and Andersen, 2013, 2015).
Signature Cognitive and Evaluative Effects
Inference and Memory
Early work on transference has assessed activation of a
signiﬁcant-other representation and its use via a recognition-
memory paradigm assessing what one remembers about a
new person and the tendency to “ﬁll in the blanks” about
him or her using the signiﬁcant-other information stored in
memory (adapted from Cantor and Mischel, 1977). Research has
demonstrated that after learning about a new person who exhibits
some subtle similarity to a signiﬁcant other, individuals will tend
to assume that the new person possesses other features of their
signiﬁcant other. That is, they report higher conﬁdence in having
learned speciﬁc features about the new person that they in fact
did not—features relevant to signiﬁcant-other knowledge (e.g.,
Andersen and Cole, 1990; Andersen and Baum, 1994; Andersen
et al., 1995; Baum and Andersen, 1999; Berenson and Andersen,
2006; Saribay and Andersen, 2007; Przybylinski and Andersen,
2013, 2015). The individual remembers the new person in a
manner colored by the stored signiﬁcant-other knowledge, based
on subtle resemblance to the signiﬁcant other (versus to a yoked
participant’s signiﬁcant other). For instance, if an individual ﬁnds
out that a new person likes to knit and it so happens that the
individual’s own sister likes to knit and is also very self-conﬁdent,
the individual is more likely to incorrectly remember having
learned that the new person is actually very self-conﬁdent.
In this research, resemblance to a signiﬁcant other is usually
constructed as a small number of signiﬁcant-other based features
embedded among distractor cues (irrelevant features), which
makes the triggering/cueing process relatively implicit in all
of our experiments. Accordingly, the eﬀect has been found
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even when signiﬁcant-other features are presented subliminally
(Glassman and Andersen, 1999a), and thus outside of conscious
awareness. The transference eﬀect occurs eﬀortlessly, and cannot
be controlled easily—that is, it is automatic (see Andersen
et al., 2007)—and also persists over time (Glassman and
Andersen, 1999b). Moreover, the eﬀect arises even when the
signiﬁcant-other representation is activated based on subtle
facial resemblance to a new person. That is, individuals made
inferences about the new person consistent with knowledge of
their signiﬁcant other after being presented with a photograph,
allegedly of the new person, which they had previously rated (in
a prior session) as resembling their signiﬁcant other (Kraus and
Chen, 2010).
To rule out alternative explanations of such eﬀects, potential
experimental confounds have been carefully examined. For
instance, these eﬀects could possibly be accounted for by the
fact that participants themselves generated their own signiﬁcant-
other features used to describe the new person in a previous
session (Greenwald and Banaji, 1989), but did not generate such
features for the yoked-control condition. Since memory tends
to be better for self-generated materials, a control condition
is used to include descriptions that the participant also self-
generated, but instead to describe a social category the person
tends to use (Andersen and Cole, 1990), or a non-signiﬁcant other
in the person’s life (e.g., Andersen et al., 1995; Glassman and
Andersen, 1999b), or in some cases, no one person at all (the
no representation condition, e.g., Przybylinski and Andersen,
2013, 2015). Such control conditions address self-generation
eﬀects. The inference and memory eﬀect, in sum, is stronger
for representations of a signiﬁcant other than for other self-
generated information and for social categories the individual
tends to use. Hence, the eﬀect cannot be reduced to simple social
categorization eﬀects (e.g., stereotyping) or to self-generation.
Much research shows that transference is quite pervasive
and occurs even averaging across individual diﬀerences in
relationships. Indeed, the transference eﬀect, as indexed by this
signature cognitive measure, occurs regardless of whether the
individual views the signiﬁcant other positively or negatively
(e.g., Andersen and Baum, 1994; Andersen et al., 1996; Hinkley
and Andersen, 1996). It also emerges independent of the self-
discrepancy the individual may have from a parent’s standpoint
(when the parent is the signiﬁcant other), for example, if the
individual has fallen short of the parent’s standards (Reznik and
Andersen, 2007), and regardless of psychological and physical
abuse by a parent (as the signiﬁcant other) while growing up
(Berenson and Andersen, 2006), chronically dissatisﬁed aﬀection
goals with the signiﬁcant other (Berk and Andersen, 2008),
and of depressive symptomatology (Andersen and Miranda,
2006; Miranda et al., 2013). Unsurprisingly, other aﬀective and
motivational consequences also arise in this process (noted
below), usually as a function of the relationship that is indirectly
activated when the signiﬁcant-other representation is cued.
Finally, as further evidence that the transference process does
in fact emerge quite automatically, evidence shows that the
transference process is moderated by variables that are known to
moderate other automatic processes. Research in other labs has
shown that transference is more likely to occur if the individual is
experiencing a circadian rhythm mismatch (it is the wrong time
of day for him/her, Kruglanski and Pierro, 2008), or is high in
need for closure (Pierro and Kruglanski, 2008), or is not inclined
to engage in careful assessment (Pierro et al., 2009).
Evaluation
Individuals evaluate people and objects quickly and relatively
automatically (e.g., Bargh et al., 1996). Such snap judgments
can be inﬂuenced by signiﬁcant-other representations. That is,
when a signiﬁcant-other representation is activated and applied
to a new person in transference, the way one evaluates the
signiﬁcant other is also implicitly evoked and applied to the
new person, and the person is evaluated as the signiﬁcant other
is—that is, positively or negatively. This signiﬁcant-other based
evaluation is grounded in the notion of schema-triggered aﬀect
(Fiske and Pavelchak, 1986), as it arises based on the triggering
of a signiﬁcant-other representation, and this eﬀect is considered
another signature eﬀect of transference. Indeed, a new person
will be evaluated more positively in self-reported Likert ratings
if he or she minimally resembles an individual’s own positive
signiﬁcant other versus a yoked participant’s positive signiﬁcant
other (Baum and Andersen, 1999) or versus an individual’s own
negative signiﬁcant other (Andersen and Baum, 1994; Andersen
et al., 1996; Berk and Andersen, 2000). As noted, this eﬀect
also occurs across a wide variety of relationships, for example,
when the signiﬁcant other is a parent and the individual believes
he or she falls short of the parent’s standards (Reznik and
Andersen, 2007; see Higgins, 1987), or if the individual was
abused by the parent (shown in facial expressions, Berenson and
Andersen,2006).
Indeed, snap judgments can also be triggered by minimal
facial resemblance in a new person, as shown by research from
two other labs—for instance, when the new person is depicted
using a photograph that was previously rated by the participant
as similar (versus not) to a loved signiﬁcant other (Kraus and
Chen, 2010), he/she is rated more positively. Along these lines,
when the new person is depicted using a photograph that was
created by morphing the face of a loved signiﬁcant-other with
another person’s face (Günaydin et al., 2012), the individuals
tended to indicate (by saying “yes” versus “no”) that the new
person possessed certain positive traits, such as trustworthiness
or intelligence. Moreover, automatic positive evaluation of a new
person, based on his or her signiﬁcant-other resemblance, is
enhanced when one’s own mortality is made salient (Cox et al.,
2008, Study 5). That is, research in yet another lab has shown
that a parent-resembling new person is evaluatedmore positively,
especially if one has just thought about one’s own death (versus
about extreme pain; Cox et al., 2008), suggesting that transference
involving a loved signiﬁcant other is more likely in the face of
death threat and may thus serve terror management functions
and serve existential needs (see Przybylinski and Andersen, 2015).
Indeed, when the signiﬁcant other is regarded positively, an
immediate positive emotional response should be elicited, and
there is evidence on the individual’s own facial expression of aﬀect
to support this. When the new person is similar to a positive
rather than a negative signiﬁcant other, more positive facial aﬀect
is expressed (as unobtrusively recorded), and this occurs quite
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quickly—that is, as one reads the relevant features presented about
the new person (Andersen et al., 1996). The quick emergence of
this emotional response suggests automatic evaluation of the new
person (Bargh et al., 1996), arising in the transference process,
based on evaluation of the signiﬁcant other. As noted, this eﬀect
is even evident when the signiﬁcant other is an abusive parent
from one’s childhood (Berenson and Andersen, 2006). People
often denote that they love their parents independent of having
negative or dangerous experiences with them, and these positive
feelings are elicited relatively immediately in transference in the
form of positive facial aﬀect (Berenson and Andersen, 2006).
Relationship Effects
Expectancies
Intermixed with the information one has about signiﬁcant others,
is information regarding how each signiﬁcant other relates to
and behaves toward the individual, and this knowledge should
be applied to new people resembling these signiﬁcant others
in transference. Indeed, research shows that the acceptance
or rejection one expects from a signiﬁcant other is activated
and applied to the new person in transference. When a new
person resembling a positive versus negative signiﬁcant other is
encountered, the new person is expected to be more accepting
and less rejecting, an eﬀect that does not hold in the control
condition (Andersen et al., 1996; Berk and Andersen, 2000).
Thus, the individual anticipates being liked or disliked by the
person based on expectations he or she has of the signiﬁcant
other, and this occurs across individual diﬀerences, such as
one’s self-discrepancy from the parent’s perspective (Reznik
and Andersen, 2007), whether or not the signiﬁcant other has
typically shown the level of aﬀection one has desired (Berk and
Andersen, 2008), whether or not one has been rejected by a loved
signiﬁcant other (Miranda et al., 2013), and whether or not a
parent was abusive in the past (Berenson and Andersen, 2006).
Beyond the transference context, relationships (as stored in
memory) are known to be linked with overall expectations
of rejection or acceptance (e.g., Baldwin and Sinclair, 1996).
Knowledge of how accepting or rejecting a signiﬁcant other is,
is stored in memory, and such expectancies are readily activated,
whether in relationships or based on priming of the relationship
(e.g., Baldwin et al., 1990; Miranda et al., 2013); this is especially
so if the individual tends to be rejection-sensitive (Downey and
Feldman, 1996).
Interpersonal Behavior
Another important component of signiﬁcant-other relationships
is behavior. The typical behaviors engaged in with the signiﬁcant
other should also be activated in transference and enacted with
the new person, evoking behavioral conﬁrmation—or a self-
fulﬁlling prophecy. The new person should then enact behaviors
the individual expects of him or her. Indeed, individuals
having a phone conversation with a naïve stranger who was
made to resemble a positive (or negative) signiﬁcant other—
or not—evoked expected behaviors from the new person
(Berk and Andersen, 2000). The new person’s part of the
conversation, as assessed by the ratings of independent judges
who were blind to condition, connoted the expected positive
or negative aﬀect, based on how positively or negatively
the signiﬁcant other was regarded, and this eﬀect was not
evident when the new person did not resemble a signiﬁcant
other. Some research suggests that this eﬀect occurs without
speciﬁc intention and thus individuals do not consciously
attempt to elicit the expected behavior (e.g., Chen and Bargh,
1997). We assume this is what happens in transference. In
a familiar example, an individual may unknowingly respond
to a new person as though he is a past romantic partner
without realizing that he or she is doing this, and in turn
the new person may start to behave as the romantic partner
would.
Furthermore, individuals in transference will also, under some
circumstances, engage in behaviors designed to solicit liking and
positive responding from the new person despite a troubled
relationship with the signiﬁcant other. That is, when a new person
resembled a well-regarded signiﬁcant other who commonly failed
to satisfy one’s goals for aﬀection, individuals not only became
more hostile as a result, but this hostility was linked to persisting
longer on a behavioral task said to increase positive response
from others (Berk and Andersen, 2008). Thus, behaviors done to
achieve a particular goal one has with the signiﬁcant other are
evoked and enacted in transference.
Motivation and Goals
The motives and goals held with signiﬁcant others are stored
with signiﬁcant-other knowledge in memory, and evidence
shows that they are, indeed, brought to mind and applied
when signiﬁcant-other knowledge is evoked. In transference,
goals to be close to positive signiﬁcant others are frequently
activated and pursued with a new person in the context of
transference. That is, individuals are motivated to approach
and to be disclosing toward a new person who bears minimal
resemblance to a positive signiﬁcant other and to avoid closeness
when the new person is similar to a negative signiﬁcant other
(Andersen et al., 1996; Berk and Andersen, 2000). As further
evidence of this, behavioral approach motivation has also been
shown to emerge in a positive transference. That is, individuals
moved their chairs closer to where they were told the new
person would sit for an upcoming interaction if this new person
resembled the positive signiﬁcant other versus not (Kraus et al.,
2010).
However, this behavior is also relationship-speciﬁc. For
example, when a loved signiﬁcant other has not met one’s goals
for love and aﬀection—the goal is unsatisﬁed—this knowledge
emerges in transference (Berk and Andersen, 2008). When such
a signiﬁcant other is evoked by resemblance to him or her in
a new person, the usual positive aﬀect evoked by transference
is disrupted and the individual shows a decreased motivation
to be close and disclosing to the new person, even showing
increased hostility. Interestingly, when the signiﬁcant other in
this study was a relative (suggesting that the relationship is not
likely to be ended), the hostility expressed by the individual was
positively related to increased enactment of explicit behaviors
that would help attain acceptance and liking from the new
person (Berk and Andersen, 2008). The goal that had not been
fulﬁlled with the signiﬁcant other was pursued in transference,
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even as the individual became more hostile and even if these
mixed messages—expressing hostility yet also seeking aﬀection—
may prove particularly confusing and frustrating to the new
person.
Beyond this, transference not only prompts goal activation
and goal pursuit—when mental representations of signiﬁcant
others are activated—but also speciﬁes both the how and why
of goal pursuit based on the activated relationship. That is,
activation of signiﬁcant-other knowledge shapes both the overall
goal to be sought, as the why of goal pursuit (its higher-order
goal), and the subgoal to be selected, as the how of goal pursuit, or
the means of pursuing that goal (Ahn and Andersen, 2016). Such
evidence attests to the richness of the transference concept in its
implications for motivation and goals.
Even achievement goals can be brought to the fore in
transference. When a signiﬁcant other holds such a goal for the
individual and knowledge of that signiﬁcant other is implicitly
activated in transference, the individual will actively pursue the
achievement goal in behavioral terms at that moment (Xu and
Andersen, 2014). Moreover, such goals from a prior signiﬁcant-
other relationship can be triggered and enacted even with a
current romantic partner (versus only with new persons). Thus
in transference, achievement goals from a prior relationship may
be suddenly pursued with a current romantic partner, even if this
goal is potentially disruptive to the current relationship (Xu and
Andersen, 2014).
Finally, research outside the domain of transference has
shown other goals can also be evoked when a signiﬁcant-other
representation is activated. For instance, priming a signiﬁcant-
other representation increases the pursuit of goals that one has
with the signiﬁcant other—such as competition, achievement,
and helping goals (Fitzsimons and Bargh, 2003; Shah, 2003a,b)
as well as attachment-style congruent goals when a signiﬁcant
other with whom one is securely or insecurely attached is primed
(Gillath et al., 2006).
Moreover, research from other labs has again shown that
while signiﬁcant others do aﬀect the kinds of goals that are
activated and pursued, goals that are activated at the moment
also can, in turn, have implications for social perception
and social categorization. When a goal has been primed,
individuals spontaneously bring to mind the individuals in
their life that are instrumental to the goal—useful for pursuit
of the goal—or not. For instance, after a goal is primed,
individuals make more memory errors between individuals
within categories of “instrumental” and “non-instrumental,”
respectively, suggesting that social categorization also depends
on the kinds of goals that are active (Fitzsimons and Shah,
2009). On the other hand, activating a signiﬁcant other
does not always foster active behavioral goal pursuit of
the most relevant goals in that relationship and may even
undermine motivation, since people often tend to “outsource”
goal pursuit plans to signiﬁcant others who are supportive of
those goals (Fitzsimons and Finkel, 2011). Moreover, being
subliminally exposed to the name of a signiﬁcant other who
is controlling can elicit reactance and oppositional behavior
(Chartrand et al., 2007), depending on the nature of the
relationship.
Some Effects of the Self in Relation to the Other
Likewise, individuals tend to form a version of the self in
the context of a particular relationship, as the self is typically
experienced with each speciﬁc signiﬁcant other, and this
relational self should be evoked in transference. Indeed, in
transference, an individual’s sense of self should parallel the
version of the self that is experienced with the relevant signiﬁcant
other. For example, one may be especially gentle and supportive
toward one’s wife, and yet one may be assertive and seek power
amongst co-workers. These various ways of perceiving the self
and behaving–for example, being both gentle and assertive–can
each constitute the self; however, in line with Mischel’s IF–
THEN theory (Mischel and Shoda, 1995), they diﬀer based on
the interpersonal context in which they are activated. When the
signiﬁcant other representation is activated, the corresponding
self is activated and enacted, as well (Andersen and Chen,
2002).
Indeed, there is evidence to support this. Adjusting for one’s
self-deﬁnition at pretest, the “relational self ” with the speciﬁc
signiﬁcant other is experienced with the new person, independent
of whether the signiﬁcant other is regarded positively or
negatively (Hinkley and Andersen, 1996). The knowledge one
has of the self with the signiﬁcant other, as well as its valence,
enters the working self-concept when the signiﬁcant-other
representation is evoked. This eﬀect can also be provoked by
facial resemblance to a signiﬁcant other in a new person. When
presented with a photo of a new person whom individuals had
previously rated as resembling a signiﬁcant other in an earlier
session, individuals described themselves more as the person they
are when with the signiﬁcant other (Kraus and Chen, 2010).
Activation of the relational self has also been shown
to indirectly activate automatic self-veriﬁcation processes in
transference. Research from another lab showed that upon
learning about a signiﬁcant-other resembling person (versus
not), individuals end up rating themselves in a manner that
better reﬂects their desired self (how they would like to be
viewed) on self-attributes most important to the relational self
(Kraus and Chen, 2009). In the absence of signiﬁcant-other
resemblance, by contrast, individuals are more likely to self-
enhance using a wide variety of attributes. In fact, when a
signiﬁcant-other representation is activated, individuals will also
describe themselves (e.g., how athletic or artistic they are) to a
new person resembling the signiﬁcant other in such a way as
to receive self-veriﬁcation for important aspects of the activated
relational self (Kraus and Chen, 2014).
Along the same lines, one’s sense of self-worth is also
dependent in part on the relational self that is active at the
moment. Contingencies of self-worth that are experienced with
a signiﬁcant other (e.g., Crocker and Wolfe, 2001; Horberg
and Chen, 2010) are activated when that signiﬁcant-other
representation is implicitly activated in transference. Research
from another lab showed that when a signiﬁcant other with
whom individuals wanted to be close to was implicitly activated,
individuals were more likely to stake their self-esteem on
performance in those domains in which the signiﬁcant other
wanted them to do well (Horberg and Chen, 2010). That is,
individuals’ sense of self-worth and the degree to which they had
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thoughts about failure were aﬀected by perceived success or lack
thereof on performance in that particular domain.
Relational selves can also help aﬃrm one’s overall sense of
self when aspects of relational selves are deemed important. For
example, research on self-aﬃrmation and relational selves from
another lab suggests that individuals who see relational self-
aspects as particularly important to their identity, can readily
maintain a positive sense of self in the face of threat (e.g., negative
feedback on an aptitude test) by focusing on these particular
aspects of the self (Chen and Boucher, 2008), and in so doing,
protect their self-esteem. That is, individuals threatened by bogus
negative feedback showed a heightened tendency to characterize
themselves in relational terms in a self-description task (Study 1)
and to evaluate positively the letters in their own names (versus
other letters, Study 2), suggesting positive implicit self-esteem
(Chen and Boucher, 2008).
Cultural diﬀerences also sway how the self is contextually
experienced and perceived in relation to diﬀerent signiﬁcant
others. For instance, research has shown that Asian Americans
show more cross-situational inconsistency across diﬀerent
relationships than do European Americans, and yet they
do maintain consistency in self-descriptions—within each
relationship—over time (an across-time consistency often found
in dispositional research, writ large, English and Chen, 2007).
Further, among European Americans, but not Asian Americans,
inconsistency in individuals’ self-perceived traits across diﬀerent
relationships has been shown to be associated with reduced
feelings of authenticity and relationship quality. Both groups,
however, experience lower levels of authenticity and relationship
satisfaction based on perceived inconsistency in the same
relationship over time (English and Chen, 2011). In short, this
research suggests that Asian Americans may be even more
likely to experience the self on an if-then basis, even though
we know European Americans also show such cross-situational
consistency, as noted.
In addition, evidence stemming from other labs does show
that the attachment system is triggered in transference (e.g.,
Cox et al., 2008, Study 5) and that attachment style and
working models clearly emerge in transference (e.g., Brumbaugh
and Fraley, 2006, 2007). In the classic transference paradigm,
manipulated resemblance to a prior romantic partner led
individuals to apply their attachment style with a past romantic
partner (the prior signiﬁcant other) to a potential dating partner,
as reﬂected in self-reported anxiety and avoidance (Brumbaugh
and Fraley, 2006). Likewise, such manipulated resemblance led
the overall attachment style to arise in relation to potential new
friends (again in anxiety and depression, Brumbaugh and Fraley,
2007). Beyond this, other research indicates that manipulated
mortality salience (thoughts of death) makes transference more
pronounced in relation to a new person (based on manipulated
resemblance to a parent), in terms of self-reported liking and
also behaviors such as arranging for less physical distance (more
physical closeness) with the new person (Cox et al., 2008,
Study 5), increasing the relevance of the parent as a secure base,
and hence, the new person as a safe haven.
Hence, the relational self that is active at any particular time is
clearly dependent on important situational cues—that is, whether
or not a new person bears a resemblance to the signiﬁcant other.
IF signiﬁcant-other resembling cues are present in the situation,
THEN the signiﬁcant-other representation will be evoked, and
the self-with-that-signiﬁcant-other will become the functioning
self-concept at that time.
Self-Regulation
In addition to shifts in the working self-concept as a function
of the implicit activation of a signiﬁcant-other representation,
contextual self-regulation is also evoked in transference. One
example of this is when negative self-with-signiﬁcant-other
features enter the operative self-concept in transference, and
thus pose a threat to the self, a self-defensive response should
be elicited—as is common in response to other threats (see
Greenberg and Pyszczynski, 1985; Steele, 1988). Indeed, when
a signiﬁcant other who is associated with a disliked version of
the self is evoked (Hinkley and Andersen, 1996; Reznik and
Andersen, 2007), the negative self-with-other features that have
been evoked should lead to the positive features that are not a
part of the relational self to enter into the working self-concept,
shielding one’s image of the self from threat, and this is in fact the
case (Hinkley and Andersen, 1996; Reznik and Andersen, 2007).
Similarly, the individual may, under some conditions, come
to protect the signiﬁcant other in transference. This kind of
regulation may occur because it is favorable for people to believe
that their signiﬁcant others are generally loving and good, despite
their faults. Thus, signiﬁcant-other faults are often transformed
into charming quirks and even virtues (e.g., Murray and
Holmes, 1993). In transference, this process may occur relatively
automatically if it tends to occur consistently in the relationship
over time. Indeed, as previously noted, immediate facial aﬀect
expressed in transference connotes the general feelings related
to the signiﬁcant other. Furthermore, when negative features of
a positive signiﬁcant other are encountered, participants express
even more positive immediate facial expressions than when they
encounter positive features, an eﬀect not evident in the control
condition (Andersen et al., 1996). Thus, it appears that facial
aﬀect transforms the valence of the feature from negative to
positive, so as to parallel the general positive aﬀect related to the
signiﬁcant other. This implies that self-regulation of this kind is
evoked because encountering a negative feature of a liked or loved
signiﬁcant other in a new person may threaten the positive regard
one has for the signiﬁcant other.
Such self-regulation could in principle extend to a signiﬁcant
other’s negative emotions or behaviors when they are expressed
by a new person, as well. In particular, for example, if a signiﬁcant
other has psychologically and physically maltreated an individual
in the past, a cue that may suggest rising tension from this
signiﬁcant other should be especially negative; however, it should
still elicit self-regulation from the individual. Hence, cues like
anger from the signiﬁcant other are likely to signal impending
abuse and may prompt self-regulation in the individual to shield
him or her from its consequences. Research has tested whether or
not new people in transference can trigger similar self-regulation
processes. For example, research tested how individuals abused
as children by a parent (or not) respond in transference when the
new person displays the pattern typical prior to abuse, such as
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becoming more irritable when awaiting the interaction (Berenson
and Andersen, 2006).
Although abused individuals displayed immediate positive
facial aﬀect in transference, they expressed negative evaluations of
the new person compared to a control condition—they expected
rejection from him or her, were indiﬀerent to whether or not
the new person liked them, and experienced signiﬁcantly more
negative mood. When they were told that the new person was
becoming irritable and angry, however, those in transference
relative to the yoked control condition exhibited more positive
facial aﬀect regardless of abuse history, presumably to maintain
general positive regard for the signiﬁcant other. Previously
abused participants showed comparable levels of positive facial
aﬀect as non-abused participants after encountering this cue.
Such a regulatory response aimed at protecting the other may not
be wise if the new person who is similar to the abusive signiﬁcant
other is also abusive; that is, abuse could be perpetuated in a new
relationship. Interestingly, abused participants exhibited much
less negative aﬀect when the new person resembled their parent
and was also acting angry and irritable compared to participants
in all other conditions, a kind of apathy that is referred to as
“emotional numbing” in the abuse literature.
In addition, individuals who possess certain emotional
vulnerabilities may be particularly likely to experience negative
aﬀect when a loved, but rejecting signiﬁcant other is activated in
transference. For example, dysphoric and non-dysphoric college
students who expected to meet a new person resembling a loved,
but sometimes rejecting, signiﬁcant other were asked to describe
themselves by completing sentences to assess their working
self-concept (as in Hinkley and Andersen, 1996). Dysphoric
individuals described themselves in terms that were rated by
judges as more rejecting (Miranda et al., 2013). They also
experienced an increase in negative aﬀect. However, when the
new person resembled a yoked signiﬁcant other, or even a disliked
signiﬁcant other, this eﬀect did not occur. In fact, dysphoric
individuals showed a decrease in depressive mood when a
disliked signiﬁcant other was brought to mind compared to a
yoked participant’s signiﬁcant other. Non-dysphoric individuals
did not experience such shifts in mood following the activation
of any of the signiﬁcant-other representations.
Another way of thinking about self-regulation and
transference is to consider how an individual may experience
having a self-discrepancy (Higgins, 1987) from the perspective
of a parent, when falling short of the standards held by that
parent, and the emotional vulnerability this entails. Indeed,
implicit activation of a parental representation in transference
should indirectly activate one’s sense of self, as well as the
parent’s standards for the self, which may not be the same
(Reznik and Andersen, 2007). Hence, activating a parental
representation may evoke a self-discrepancy (e.g., Higgins, 1987)
in transference, if such a discrepancy exists in the relationship
with the parent. A discrepancy between one’s actual self and
one’s ideal self (who one could ideally be) or one’s ought self
(who one should be) prompts feelings of dejection (as the
actual-ideal discrepancy is activated) or feelings of agitation (as
the actual-ought discrepancy is activated). These precise feelings
thus arise in transference, when relevant to the relationship.
However, when signiﬁcant-other cues are encountered in the
new person that directly bring to mind the standard a parent
holds for oneself (i.e., when the new person emphasizes hopes
for or obligations for new friends), the regulatory functions of
the standards activated (i.e., according to self-regulatory focus
theory; Higgins, 1997) should be prompted based on transference.
That is, ideal standards (or hopes) are relevant to a promotion
focus—a focus on seeking out potential gains, while ought
standards (or obligations) are relevant to a prevention focus—
a focus on threat to avoid losses. Feelings of agitation should
be exacerbated when in a state of prevention focus, whereas a
promotion focus should decrease feelings of dejection, and this is
what evidence has shown. Individuals in transference with an
actual-ideal discrepancy from their parent’s standpoint who were
presented with a cue bringing to mind the parent’s ideals showed
evidence of promotion focus that reduced feelings of dejection
while a similar cue presented to individuals with an actual-ought
discrepancy did not facilitate a reduction of agitation-related
feelings in transference (Reznik and Andersen, 2007).
Other problematic inconsistencies that exist in a signiﬁcant-
other relationship are also activated in transference. For instance,
a discrepancy in goals one has with a signiﬁcant other, such
as an unsatisﬁed goal for love and aﬀection, as noted, is
activatedwhen the signiﬁcant other is (Berk andAndersen, 2008).
This leads individuals to experience feelings of hostility toward
the new person, while still attempting to satisfy the activated
goal. That is, when the representation of the signiﬁcant other
with whom they have such a goal discrepancy is activated in
transference, individuals persist on a task designed to elicit liking
from the new person. Similarly, dysphoric individuals who have
sometimes been rejected by loved signiﬁcant others, and thus
have experienced a discrepancy in their relationship regarding
love and aﬀection, report increased depressed mood when such
a signiﬁcant other is activated (Miranda et al., 2013). They also
describe themselves in a manner conveying rejection in this
context.
Indeed, a diﬀerent way of viewing the matter of self-regulation
with respect to transference and the relational self is to ask
whether or not this relatively automatic process can ever be
intentionally short-circuited. When the transference process
perpetuates suﬀering by triggering interpersonal problems,
individuals may have good reason to want to prevent it. On the
other hand, its automaticity—that is, the notion that it arises
without eﬀort, intention, or awareness (see Andersen et al.,
2005, 2007)—should make it diﬃcult or impossible to control
(Przybylinski and Andersen, 2013). Evidence suggests that this
is so. However, it can be controlled when people make use of an
intentional strategy that can itself be automatized, which can in
fact be eﬀective in eliminating unwanted inferential and memory
biases (Przybylinski and Andersen, 2013).
In Sum
Taken together, this research convincingly demonstrates how
the self, as experienced from moment-to-moment, can vary as
a function of situational triggering cues that activate and bring
to mind stored knowledge of signiﬁcant others. When such
knowledge is activated, it indirectly activates the speciﬁc relational
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self, as well as the relationship with a particular signiﬁcant other.
This results in shifts in judgments, memory, evaluations, goals
and motivations, as well as emotional state, and perceptions of
the self, based on this activated stored knowledge. In turn, how
one responds to a new person at the moment will also depend
on the nature of the signiﬁcant other that is activated in the
moment. The eﬀects tend to be of moderate eﬀect size and are well
replicated (e.g., Miranda et al., 2013; Przybylinski and Andersen,
2013, 2015). In this sense, the evidence demonstrates the cross-
situational variability of the person in the domain of interpersonal
relationships as a function of triggers in the current situation.
While we do not assume that everything about personality
is interpersonal, the fact that signiﬁcant-other representations
have been shown to be activated quite automatically, based on
incidental contextual cues, implies that even when the individual
is consciously focused on other things or enacting a common
routine exchange with another person, the process is still likely
to unfold, at least in subtle ways. Of course, if the individual
is anticipating further interaction with the person or for other
reasons is more engaged, self-relevant expectations, emotions,
and motivations should be more likely. In this respect, there are
likely to be boundary conditions on the more emotionally laden
phenomena we have observed. In addition, as previously noted,
there may be circumstances under which the transference process
is particularly likely to occur such as when one is experiencing
a circadian rhythm mismatch (Kruglanski and Pierro, 2008), is
high in need for closure (Pierro and Kruglanski, 2008), or low
in assessment orientation (Pierro et al., 2009), or when one’s
mortality has been threatened in some manner (Cox et al., 2008).
Finally, although we do not focus exclusively on within-person
designs that directly examine variability in responses within
the individual across contexts—nor focus on stability in the
transference eﬀect over time (longitudinally)—we have shown
that the transference eﬀect, as provoked (or not) by initial
situational (person) cues and that this persists at least over a
2- to 3-week period concerning that new person (Glassman and
Andersen,1999b).Moreover, evenwhenweuseabetween-subjects
design, this still does involve long-standing (and relatively stable)
stored signiﬁcant-other knowledge. The experimental designs
are also carefully controlled, by manipulating whether or not the
individual’sownsigniﬁcantother is cued (i.e., exposure todiﬀering
interpersonal situations), in order to assess how responses then
vary.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
The complex, situation-dependent ways of responding we have
empirically shown to occur in transference provide support for
a relational IF–THEN conceptualization of personality, and call
for future research that could clarify the conditions of behavior
and personality, based on situational cues. First, signiﬁcant others
are often not thought of as merely “positive” or “negative,” but
rather possess varying degrees of ambivalence that have speciﬁc
signiﬁcance for one’s experience when these signiﬁcant-other
representations are activated. Such ambivalence, as it may be
triggered situationally by transference, is in need of further testing
beyond the activation of standards that the signiﬁcant other holds
and past abuse by that signiﬁcant other.
Considerably more research on these topics is necessary,
particularly that which focuses on emotion and emotion
regulation in transference. For instance, it is now well-known
that, although signiﬁcant others may be loved, they may still
be associated with painful emotions and this suﬀering can
be perpetuated in transference. Conceptually, it is of central
importance to ascertain whether or not or precisely how people
may prevent the processes of transference (beyond just memory
and inferences, as in Przybylinski and Andersen, 2013) from
transpiring when triggering cues are present in a situation.
The ability for one to regulate a relatively automatic way of
responding evoked implicitly and without intention so as to not
be aﬀected by it is worth further consideration.
In addition, examining the conditions in which positive
interpersonal results may come about in transference, as opposed
to just negative ones, would be important to understanding
the way positive interpersonal responses are related to
representations of signiﬁcant others. For instance, in some
circumstances individuals should not only make certain mistakes
in interpreting the new person, but also may pay special attention
to him or her and be especially motivated to understand
him or her, such as through empathy. These consequences of
transference have not been adequately explored.
CONCLUSION
To conclude, our model, known as the relational self, integrates
the self and personality. We draw in part on Mischel’s (1968)
notion of cross-situational variability in behavior, and also
show consistency within individuals based in the cognitive-
aﬀective processing system and their personality signature
(Mischel and Shoda, 1995; Metcalfe and Mischel, 1999). Our
model shows an intrinsic link between the situation and
an individual’s responses in the situation—including emotion,
expectancy, and the experience of the self—that is grounded in
relationships with signiﬁcant others. We argue that signiﬁcant-
other representations can be individually activated at any time as
a function of situational cues, leading to the indirect activation of
the self when with the signiﬁcant other, as well as the relationship
with the signiﬁcant other. These activated representations aﬀect
interpersonal behavior and other responses in predictable ways.
We argue that the precise responses in transference are speciﬁc
to the person and to the relationshipwith the signiﬁcant other that
is evoked, even though they are stable over time—that is, when
similar cues are present in the environment, similar responses
should be evoked. In this way, the self and personality are, at
any given moment, dependent on cues in the situation as well as
on the chronic accessibility of signiﬁcant-other representations.
Thus, signiﬁcant-other knowledge stored in memory that may
be activated is stable over time, as is the version of the self one
is with that other. Thus, transference occurs on an IF–THEN
basis—IF one encounters someone who is similar to a signiﬁcant
other, THEN one becomes the version of the self when with that
signiﬁcant other. Indeed, this process transpires in individualistic
cultures like the U.S.—where the research was conducted—as
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well as across genders, and among individuals not speciﬁcally
preselected as allocating special attention to relationships.
Overall, the contributions of Mischel and his colleagues—
both conceptual and empirical—facilitate an important shift in
the ﬁeld of personality. Researchers are increasingly embracing
the notion that behavioral variability is fundamental to
personality, and are embracing ways to test the complexity of
that variability, versus regarding it as merely error variance.
This can enrich our understanding of individuals greatly.
As a relational IF–THEN framework, our model reﬂects this
perspective in personality theory, and can be considered
one of various IF–THEN models of personality to emerge
in the last decade or so, such as those reconceptualizing
CAUs (Mischel and Shoda, 1995) as “schemas” or organized
knowledge structures similarly brought to the fore in
relevant situations, thus allowing for situation-speciﬁc
interpretive tendencies (Cervone, 2004; Cervone and Batooszek,
2013).
Our work shows the important role signiﬁcant others play
in understanding personality, especially aﬀect, expectations,
behavior, and how the self is experienced from one situation to
the next. It also integrates ideas from psychodynamic theory, as
well as those from social cognition and learning theory. Drawing
on Mischel’s insights, the model combines diverse areas of
psychology to map the complexity of personality, by integrating
an individual’s interpersonal history with the present situation,
and highlighting why an individual’s variability by context reﬂects
essential aspects of the person.
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